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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND SELECTIVE
ALLOCATION
Doctrinal Assistance for the Erring Donee*
Joel E. Hoffmant
Avoiding invalid appointments by selective allocation of owned and
appointive property among the provisions of the donee's will has become
a potentially important method of controlling the impact of intent-
defeating legal doctrines on estate plans incorporating powers of appoint-
ment. This application of the selective allocation principle can most
easily be seen in the context of the rules governing special powers.'
Suppose that the will of X transfers ten thousand dollars to A for life,
remainder as A shall by will appoint to or among C, D, and E. Suppose
also that the will of A combines the fund with an additional ten thou-
sand dollars and transfers the aggregate to B and C to be divided equally
between them. The limited scope of the power forbids transfer of any
of the X-derived fund to B while permitting its transfer to C; yet neither
B nor C is in any way barred from receiving any of A's own ten thou-
sand dollars. By selectively allocating to C the ten thousand dollars
received from X and leaving A's contribution for B, A's executor can
satisfy the entire legacy without exceeding the power. Yet any other
division of the aggregate would partially fail because it would involve
the illegal transfer of appointive property to B. Only selective allocation
can save A's dispositive plan from destruction.
Although the use of selective allocation, here and in other cases, can
be shown to be consistent with the policies governing the transmission
of wealth from generation to generation, judicial rationalizations of the
doctrine have fallen far short of establishing it on a firm theoretical
basis. Application of the device, moreover, has been unnecessarily re-
stricted; it is susceptible of use in a far greater variety of cases than
the courts have as yet considered appropriate for its employment. Be-
The author is indebted to Professors Ashbel G. Gulliver and Elias Clark of the Yale Law
School, and to Robert J. Engelman, Esq., of the Connecticut bar, for their valuable
criticisms and advice.
* The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of the Department of Justice.
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 458, for biographical data.
1 The scope of the class of possible appointees, the members of which are called "objects,"
Restatement, Property § 319(3) (1940), determines the classification of the power as general
or special. See also 3 Powell, Real Property ff 386, at 297 (1952) (hereinafter cited as
Powell]. For present purposes a general power is defined as any power of which the donee
or his estate is an object. See 2 Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 875, at 351 (2d ed. 1956)[hereinafter cited as Sines & Smith]; 5 American Law of Property § 23.4, at 467 (Casner
ed. 1952) thereinafter cited as Am. L. Prop.].
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cause it is both a desirable and a potentially effective method of con-
trolling the arbitrary effect of intent-defeating rules on the use of powers
of appointment, a close evaluation of selective allocation is long overdue.
IN GENERAL
The Use and Misuse of Powers of Appointment
The power of appointment, known to English law since the fifteenth
century,2 has become significant in the United States only in the last few
decades.3 To explain the negligible role of powers in this country prior
to 1900 is difficult, but the reasons for their growing popularity are
clear. In an age of increasingly heavy taxation, owners have turned
to complex methods of holding and transferring property in the hope
of minimizing their tax burden. But tax reduction is not the only con-
cern. Coping effectively with the exigencies of modern life requires ever
more flexible techniques of property enjoyment and transfer. The power
of appointment, at once complex in theory and flexible in practice, serves
these modern needs more fully than any other device in the law of
property.4
This is especially so with respect to death transfers. Capable of
both creation and exercise by either inter vivos or testamentary instru-
ment, and variable in scope, the power of appointment can be integrated
into a variety of estate plans. And with knowledge of its potential bene-
fits becoming increasingly common, estate-planners no longer hesitate
to fulfill the testator's desires with this exceedingly old, yet exceedingly
modern, device.
Use of the power of appointment, of course, is not without its prob-
lems. The legal consequences flowing from a particular property dis-
position depend largely on its doctrinal characterization, and the courts
have recognized in the power of appointment elements both of property
2 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 136, 274 (4th ed. 1935); 7 id. at 150-51 (2d
ed. 1937).
3 See 3 Powell fI 385, at 287-88; Restatement, Property 1810 (1940).
4 See Restatement, Property 1809 (1940); 2 Simes & Smith § 861, at 343. Professor
Leach has suggested that yet another benefit of powers is the assurance of respect for the
donee by the objects. 5 Am. L. Prop. § 23.1, at 461.
5 See Leach, Cases on Future Interests 575 (2d ed. 1940) ; 3 Powell ff 385, at 288; Restate-
ment, Property 1808-09 (1940); 2 Simes & Smith § 861, at 343. Today, much of the law
of powers concerns the federal estate tax treatment of the device. See Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 2041; Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes ch. 11 (1956); 2 Mertens,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation ch. 19 (1959). For the impact of state death taxes, see
3 Powell ff 392, at 318-24.
Uses of powers outside the field of testamentary transfers are, of course, also possible.
Among these are attempts to reduce personal income taxes while still retaining some measure
of control over productive assets, by transferring them subject to a reserved power of ap-
pointment exercisable inter vivos. For the legislative counterattack, see Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §§ 671-78.
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and agency law.' Sometimes reflecting the one and sometimes the other
doctrine, the case law on powers has not been entirely consistent.7 The
ambivalent nature of his interest is usually less apparent to the donee,
whose understandable lack of legal sophistication frequently leads him
either to dispose of the appointive property and his own assets in one
mass,8 or, if he does recognize a responsibility to treat them separately,
to ignore the special problems which attend the transfer of property
under a power.' To the extent that the facts of the donee's behavior
are nonetheless subjected to agency-oriented rules, the legal conse-
quences may differ from those he contemplated and desired.' The
flexibility sought, therefore, becomes mere unpredictability, and tax con-
sequences a matter of chance."
Rather than permit such disorganizing consequences, courts are some-
times willing to preserve the parties' general goals by employing selective
allocation.
6 It can readily be seen that, historically, the donee acted under the authority conferred
upon him by the donor in selecting the appointee. Such action was a type of agency.
Similarly, it can be readily realized that in making this selection the donee was exercising
one of the most important prerogatives of ownership. By deciding upon the ultimate
recipient of beneficial ownership the donee was exercising an incident of property owner-
ship, namely, the power of disposition. 3 Powell ff 385, at 287. Professor Leach, on the other
hand, minimizes the property aspect of the interest of the donee of a special power, al-
though he recognizes this feature when the power is general. 5 Am. L. Prop. §§ 23.4-.5. His
attitude toward special powers is even more firmly expressed in his Restatement. Restate-
ment, Property 1815 (1940) ("[the special power] is in no proper sense ownership").
This historical agency approach to powers has produced the relation-back doctrine, first
mentioned in Oke v. Heath, 1 Ves. Sen. 136, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748). The essence of
relation-back is that the donee, in exercising the power, is merely performing an act of
amanuensis for the donor. The donee is said to be filling in the blanks in the donor's will.
See generally 5 Am. L. Prop. § 23.3; 2 Simes & Smith §§ 911-13. The doctrine is, however,
merely a method of explaining the much older rule that the appointee takes directly from
the donor rather than from the donee. See 2 Simes & Smith § 912; note 2 supra. See also 2
Simes & Smith § 920, at 391. But see McfDougal, "Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus
Clarification and Reform," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1109 (1942). ("The purely tautological
character of all of this reasoning in terms of 'relation back' . . . and so forth, is obvious
and has often been deplored.")
7 See 7 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 176 (2d ed. 1937); 3 Powell f1 385, at 287.
8 For an example of a common corrective statute, see N.Y. Real Prop. L. § 176 (donee
will be deemed to have exercised power if he makes a total testamentary disposition of his
owned property).
9 This type of situation is contemplated by statutes like N.Y. Real Prop. L. § 175 (donee
will be deemed to have exercised power when he has purported to convey an estate which
he could not otherwise convey).
10 The effect of relation-back in distinguishing the legal status of appointive and owned
property appears in a variety of contexts: application of the Rule Against Perpetuities, ap-
plication of the Rule in Shelley's Case, dower and curtesy rights of the donee's spouse, the
donee's covenants respecting land use, jurisdiction of the donee's domicile to tax, rights of
the donee's creditors, choice of law governing the exercise of the power, capacity of the
donee, jurisdiction to tax the donee's estate, applicability of statutory restrictions on gifts
to charity, extent of the statutory share belonging to the donee's spouse. See 3 Powell ff 387,
at 298-99; 2 Simes & Smith § 911.
11 While, for powers created after October 21, 1942, the tax consequences to the donee are
unaffected (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041; compare Edith Wilson Paul, 16 T.C. 743
(1951) (pre-1942 power)), a default taker's unexpected acquisition of income or property
may seriously disrupt an over-all tax plan for the donee's entire family.
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The Allocation Problem
Because the donee is empowered, within the limits imposed by law
or by the donor, to appoint as he sees fit, he may establish the propor-
tions of owned and appointive property in which each gift in his will
is to be satisfied. Going further, it is his function and therefore his
duty as appointor to establish these proportions, and the rule has been
formalized that his intent governs.' The donee, however, often fails to
allocate the two types of property over which he has control. Since the
fiduciaries under his and the donor's will must nevertheless be instructed
as to the disposition of the property, the duty devolves upon the courts
to establish the proportions.
No problems attend such an all-embracing or common disposition if
it is entirely void or valid irrespective of the proportions; here ratable
allocation suffices, and is universally used.'3 On the other hand, the
distinction between owned and appointive property may mean, as it
did in the opening illustration, that although all are valid respecting
owned property, only some of the gifts in the common disposition are
valid as appointments. Here ratable allocation will impair the total
effectiveness of the disposition. In these circumstances the court can,
without ignoring the owned-appointive distinction, allocate appointive
property to the gifts valid as appointments and owned property to those
remaining. This procedure is known as selective allocation.
The Common-Disposition Requirement
A preliminary question which must be answered affirmatively before
allocation becomes an issue, however, is whether the donee has actually
made a common disposition of owned and appointive property. To do
this the donee must blend owned and appointive assets into a single
fund and dispose of it as an entity. When the donee indicates that
specific property is to pass to a named taker there is no occasion for
courts to allocate; both as owner and as donee his expressed desires
control.14
12 See 5 Am. L. Prop. § 23.59, at 625; Gulliver, Cases on Future Interests 592 (1959);
Restatement, Property §§ 363-64 (1940) ; id. at 2000.
13 Restatement, Property §§ 363(1)(b), 363(2)(b), 363(3)(b), 364(1)(b), 364(3)(b)
(1940); 2 Simes & Smith § 975, at 438-39, 441, 445, 447. Ratable allocation is best defined
by the Restatement illustration:
if the donee gives owned property worth $6,000 and appoints appointive property worth
$4,000 to A, B and C, each one of these persons receives owned and appointive property
in the proportions of 6 to 4.
Restatement, Property § 363, comment h at 2015 (1940). Thus, ratable allocation is the
apportionment of owned and appointive property to each gift in the same proportions as
those in the total common disposition.
14 See 3 Powell 401 at 371; Restatement, Property § 363, comments d, e at 2011
(1940) ; id. § 364, comments e, f at 2011-14; 2 Simes & Smith § 975, at 439. See also note
12 supra.
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The requisite blending of owned and appointive property may occur
through the donee's express exercise of the power of appointment or
through acts amounting to such an exercise;' 5 or blending may result
from the operation of statutes which create under certain conditions
the presumption that a power has been exercised. Many combinations
of factors, both in testamentary language and in surrounding circum-
stances, have been held to produce blending, and no useful generali-
zations can be drawn from the cases save that the result is wholly
subject to judicial conclusions respecting the donee's intent. 6 The
statutes usually provide that unless a contrary intent is shown a testa-
mentary disposition of all a decedent's property or a residuary clause
in his will shall be deemed an exercise of all or some powers of appoint-
ment of which he was the donee." Depending on judicial interpretation
of the statutory requirements, the power may be considered exercised
by the will as a whole or by the residuary clause alone.' 8 But in any
case, if a blending disposition-whether a complete will, a smaller
group of dispositive clauses, or merely a residuary clause-makes two
or more distinct gifts, the allocation problem must be met.
Allocation in Inter Vivos Instruments
Although, as a matter of theory, an inter vivos common disposition
of owned and appointive property could present an allocation problem,
no controversy involving selective allocation in the context of an inter
vivos transfer has yet reached the American case reports. This is not
surprising. Selective allocation becomes useful only when one or more
of the gifts in a common disposition, valid with respect to owned prop-
erty, is void as an exercise of the power of appointment. The relation-
back method of applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to testamentary
powers, which is the most common cause of invalidity in appointment
cases, does not govern the donee's exercise of a general inter vivos
power; the period of the Rule is instead computed from the date of
the exercise.' 9 Hence, with respect to general inter vivos powers, no
'15 See generally Blagge v. Miles, 3 Fed. Cas. 559, 566 (No. 1479) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(Story, J.).
16 See generally Note, "The Residuary Clause and Powers of Appointment," 27 Notre
Dame Law. 257 (1952).
17 See 3 Powell f 397, at 345 n.38 (collecting statutes). Massachusetts has arrived at a
similar rule without benefit of legislation. Amory v. Meredith, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 397 (1863).
18 E.g., Lockwood v. Mildeberger, 159 N.Y. 181, 53 N.E. 803 (1899) (residuary clause
only); Merwin v. Carroll, 171 Md. 346, 188 Atl. 803 (1937) (whole will).
19 Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 524 (4th ed. 1942). Relation-back has led to
the rule that in determining the validity of a testamentary appointment, the permissible
period is computed from the date of the power's creation rather than that of its exercise,
although the facts are viewed as of the time of exercise. Id. at §§ 515, 523-23.2. But see
Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 501 (1953) (applying inter vivos rule to all powers).
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distinction exists for perpetuities purposes between owned and appointive
property, and a gift valid under the Rule as an inter vivos transfer of
owned property is also valid as an exercise of the power20 As the testa-
mentary rules probably would be applied in cases of special inter vivos
powers, the development of a distinct inter vivos branch of the selective
allocation principle is unlikely.21
PRESENT LAW
Selective allocation first appeared on the American scene in the New
York Court of Appeals case of Fargo v. Squiers. The testatrix, who
was the donee of a general testamentary power created by her father's
will, died leaving a will whose preamble expressed an intent to exercise
that power23 After granting specific bequests of about $50,000, the
will, again referring to the power, created a residuary trust whose bene-
ficiaries were not lives in being at the death of the father. The com-
bined effect of New York's Rule Against Perpetuities 4 and the state's
statutory relation-back doctrine was to invalidate the appointment to
the extent that the residuary trust beneficiaries were appointees.
The Appellate Division apparently assumed that the residuary clause
alone exercised the power and affirmed the trial court's decision that the
donee had failed to make a valid appointment.26 In the Court of Appeals,
however, the donee's executors argued that "the legacies and expenses
of administration should be paid out of the property which she had the
power to appoint, either in whole or pro rata.27 The argument seems to
have been that, contrary to the Appellate Division's assumption, the
whole will exercised the power and that, accordingly, the court should
either partially validate the appointment by ratably allocating appointive
property to the charges and legacies, or employ selective allocation to
save as much of the appointment as possible.
20 See 5 Am. L. Prop. § 23.59, at 629; 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 713, at 94 (3d ed.
1939).
21 The commentators are in agreement that the testamentary rule should apply to inter
vivos instruments. Restatement, Property § 363, comment g at 2014 (1940); id. § 364, com-
ment g at 2020; 2 Simes & Smith § 975, at 447. See 3 Powell ff 401, at 373.22 154 N.Y. 250, 48 N.E. 509 (1897).
23 "[I]ntending hereby ... to direct the payment and distribution... of the sum held
in trust for me, under the provisions of ... such last will ... hereby executing each and
every power of appointment vested in me by said will.... ." Fargo v. Squiers, 6 App. Div.
485, 490, 39 N.Y. Supp. 648, 650 (1st Dep't 1896), modified, 154 N.Y. 250, 48 N.E. 509
(1897).
24 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11.
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1896, ch. 547, § 158 (realty), held by the court to apply to per-
sonalty by virtue of N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11 (inter alia, applying realty rules to per-
sonalty). The statute was amended in 1959 to apply in terms to personalty. N.Y. Real
Prop. Law § 178.
26 6 App. Div. 485, 39 N.Y. Supp. 648 (1st Dep't 1896).
27 154 N.Y. at 252.
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Despite the complete failure of the meagre authority cited by the
executors to support this theory,28 the Court of Appeals more or less
agreed. Holding that each clause of the will exercised the power and
that the gifts contained in each could therefore validly be satisfied with
appointive assets, it ordered the specific bequests (but not expenses)
to be paid as far as possible from appointive property. Since the
specific bequests consumed more than the value of the appointive prop-
erty, the residuary trust remained fully intact. The court buttressed its
decision by reference to two well-established, if somewhat remote,
doctrines. The first was that allowing departure from the usual rule
making personalty primarily liable for a decedent's debts when the
rule would do violence to the testamentary plan. The second was that
which denies a creditor with a claim on two funds the right to take
satisfaction from the one constituting another creditor's only resource. 9
To what extent the disposition of the property was actually affected by
the court's decision is unclear, as the residuary beneficiaries may well
have been some or all of the takers in default of appointment.3 0 Irre-
spective of the relative effects on the takers, however, the court appeared
to sanction the use of selective allocation to mitigate the damage done
by the relation-back application of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Somewhat contemporaneously with the Fargo decision arose the
Pennsylvania case of Van Syckel's Estate.3' From the court's opinions in
this case and in a later proceeding involving the same estate,3 2 it appears
28 The executors cited an English treatise discussing exoneration of realty and marshalling
for creditors, 2 Jarman, Wills 584, 637-39 (5th ed. 1881), and two English cases on the
exoneration principle, Roberts v. Walker, 1 Russ. & M. 752, 39 Eng. Rep. 288 (Ch. 1830),
Bench v. Biles, 4 Madd. 187, 56 Eng. Rep. 676 (Ch. 1819). For the court's response, see
note 29 infra and accompanying text.
29 The court cited three unconvincing English cases, Wilday v. Barnett, L.R. 6 Eq. 191
(1868) (holding that where will exercised power, residuary legatees were restrained from
reaching appointive property until specific legacies were paid in full); Wollaston v. King,
L.R. 8 Eq. 164 (1869) (denying selective allocation despite violation of Rule Against
Perpetuities where default takers were legatees of donor's owned property and appointee
wished to receive this instead of appointive property); Gainsford v. Dunn, L.R. 17 Eq.
405 (1874) (allowing ratable allocation where whole will, exercising nonexclusive power,
made some objects specific, and some residuary, legatees), and an irrelevant earlier decision
of its own, Rice v. Harbeson, 63 N.Y. 493 (1876) (restricting mortgagee to owned realty
to save owned personalty for legatees).
30 The default takers were those who would have been the donor's heirs had he died in
New York immediately after the death of the donee, his wife predeceasing him. 154 N.Y. at
256, 48 N.E. at 510. The residuary beneficiaries were the donor's grandchildren. Id. at 258,
48 N.E. at 510. Neither the Appellate Division nor the Court of Appeals indicated whether
the beneficiaries' mother, the donor's daughter, was alive. Nor can those who would have
taken under the capture doctrine be ascertained.
For discussions of the capture doctrine, see Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615,
624, 75 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1947); 5 Am. L. Prop. § 23.61; Restatement, Property § 365 (1940);
2 Simes & Smith § 974; Carleton, "The Doctrine of Capture Under a General Power of
Appointment," 35 Mass. L.Q. 23 (May 1950); Stokey, "Two Problems Arising From
Powers of Appointment," 28 B.U.L. Rev. 335 (1948). See also Note, "Intestacy and General
Powers of Appointment," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1025 (1942).
31 9 Pa. Dist. 367 (Orphans' Ct. 1900).
32 Van Syckel's Estate, 9 Pa. D. & C. 485 (Orphans' Ct. 1927).
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that the donee exercised a nonexclusive special testamentary power by
her whole will, which unfortunately included a gift to a nonobject of the
power. One of the permissible appointees, who had received a smaller
share than the others, argued that the entire appointment was invalid
because of the offending gift-a conclusion which would have required
distribution of the appointive property equally among the objects in
their capacity as default takers under the donee's will. The Orphans'
Court, affirming the adjudication of the auditing judge, sustained the
appointment by allocating all the appointive property to the objects of
the power and ordering payment of the unauthorized appointee's gift
from owned property. Looking not to the analogies employed in New
York but to the maxim reddendo singula singulis,33 the court theorized
that the will in effect made two dispositions to two classes of takers and
that each disposition should be attributed to the appropriate class.
Failure of an appointment as beyond the scope of the power was thus
added to invalidity of an appointment under the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties as a result which legitimately might be avoided by selective
allocation.
Subsequent cases have secured the use of selective allocation in the
two fact patterns involved in the Fargo and Van Syckel decisions.
Despite the seeming availability of the doctrine in the context of other
intent-defeating rules, however, these categories have remained the only
ones in which it has been employed.
The Special-Power Cases
The cases utilizing selective allocation to save appointments made
partially to nonobjects have been relatively straightforward, although
infrequent. Having denied a petition to review its Van Syckel decision, 4
the Philadelphia County Orphans' Court has allowed selective allocation
in the only two special-power cases which have since arisen. 5 Aside
from these Pennsylvania cases, no tribunal has spoken on the matter
except the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Apparently without any
awareness of the Pennsylvania precedent, that court, in an early com-
mon-disposition case, reserved appointive property to the objects of a
33 "By referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate
object." Black, Law Dictionary 442 (4th ed. 1951).
34 Van Syckel's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 744 (Orphans' Ct. 1901).
35 In Tower's Estate, 5 Pa. D. & C. 369 (Orphans' Ct. 1924), the court ordered debts and
expenses to be paid from owned property, despite protests from the remaindermen, where
the donee's whole will, consisting entirely of a residuary gift to the sole object, exercised a
special power over income. In Jessup's Estate, 17 Pa. A. & C. 517 (Orphans' Ct, 1933),
all appointments were held valid where the donee expressly exercised two special powers by
a single disposition to the objects of both, the default takers being among the appointees.
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special power on the Van Syckel theory of selective allocation. 6 As in
Fargo, the appointees in the Massachusetts case may have been some or
all of the takers in default of appointment, so that the actual effect of
the decision upon them is uncertain.37
The Perpetuities Cases
Pennsylvania. While the development of selective allocation as a
means of avoiding perpetuities problems has been more extensive, it
has also been more confused. Pennsylvania, the leader in using selective
allocation to validate the exercise of special powers, has rejected the
device in the perpetuities context. In Jackson's Estate" the same court
which decided Van Syckel avoided allocation problems by holding that
the two general testamentary powers held by the decedent had been
exercised by her residuary clause and not by her whole will. The
court nevertheless went on to say that if its decision should be reversed
on appeal so that appointive property should become available to satisfy
legacies, it favored ratable rather than selective allocation despite pos-
sible perpetuities difficulties.3" Reversing the Orphans' Court on the
preliminary question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the whole
will to be an exercise of the powers and the total of owned and appoin-
tive property to constitute a common fund, any or all of which was
available for legacies.10 It endorsed the lower court's suggestion on the
allocation problem, however, simply quoting the opinion below and
adding, "with this we agree."'" The court's refusal to employ selective
allocation may well have eased the residuary legatee's pain on being
deprived of exclusive rights to the appointive assets since the residuary
legatees were in this case entitled to receive at least part of any of that
property not validly appointed.'
The rule rejecting selective allocation in perpetuities cases, so effort-
lessly established in Jackson's Estate, received more detailed considera-
36 Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 75 N.E. 141 (1905).
37 The reports do not identify the named default takers, if indeed there were any. The
appointees were among the intestate successors of the donor. Id. at 166, 75 N.E. at 141.
38 34 Pa. D. & C. 337 (Orphans' Ct. 1938), rev'd 337 Pa. 561, 12 A.2d 338 (1940).
39 It is not necessary for us to determine the question, but in case our conclusion on
the principal question should be reversed we express the opinion that the legacies (in-
cluding the benefits of the tax free clause) should be apportioned between testatrix's
own estate, and the two trust funds upon the basis of the net values of the three funds.
We see no reason why testatrix's own estate should be appropriated first, or why a
choice should be made between the two appointed funds.
Id. at 339.
40 Jackson's Estate, 337 Pa. 561, 12 A.2d 338 (1940).
41 Id. at 570, 12 A.2d at 343.
42 One of the donee's powers had been reserved by her under an inter vivos transfer with
no gift in default of appointment. Id. at 563, 12 A.2d at 340. The default takers under the
other power cannot be identified, but the power had been created by the donee's father.
Id. at 564, 12 A.2d at 340.
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tion thirteen years later. In Harris Trust,43 the only Pennsylvania case
since Jackson to raise an allocation question, the donee appointed part
of the property subject to her general testamentary power to an inter
vivos trust which she had established some years before her death. All
parties conceded that the relation-back theory of the Rule Against
Perpetuities would invalidate the appointment to the extent that the
donee's great-grandchildren, who were income beneficiaries and remain-
dermen of the trust, received appointive property. But the guardian
ad litem of the great-grandchildren urged that their gifts be saved under
the New York doctrine of Fargo v. Squiers by allocating owned property
to the trust and the appointive property to the other dispositions in the
donee's will. The auditing judge of the Orphans' Court, without in-
voking Jackson, rejected the argument on the theory that evasion of the
Rule Against Perpetuities was in no circumstances to be countenanced
and hence was not a legitimate goal of selective allocation 4 5 The full
bench, on review, also refused to employ selective allocation, but on
the ground that the donee, rather than making a common disposition,
had specifically exercised the power solely by her bequest to the trust.
The court half-heartedly mentioned as an alternative reason for its
action the certainly erroneous view that the New York doctrine itself
did not permit allocation "in violation of the rule against perpetuities. 48
Since no appeal was taken, the Jackson-Harris view presumably will
govern the disposition of future Pennsylvania attempts to mitigate
perpetuities problems by selective allocation.
Massachusetts. The contrary position has been adopted by Massa-
chusetts. Applying the same theory generally used to justify selective
allocation in the special-power cases,47 the Supreme Judicial Court in
Minot v. Paine48 approved use of the device to sustain the validity of
an appointment under the Rule Against Perpetuities. The donee of a
general testamentary power had left a will "wherein she exercised the
power" but "made no distinction between her own and the property
appointed."'49 One trust established by the will would have violated
the Rule were it considered an appointment, but the other trusts and
all of the pecuniary legacies were free of any invalidity. The trustees
under the donor's will specifically requested instructions on the question
43 83 Pa. D. & C. 417 (Orphans' Ct. 1953).
44 Id. at 431. The named takers in default were the donee's surviving children, while
the beneficiaries were the donee's great-grandchildren. Id. at 418-19.
45 Id. at 427.
40 Id. at 431. Compare notes 70-77 infra and accompanying text.
47 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
48 230 Mass. 514, 120 N.E. 167 (1918).
49 Id. at 523, 120 N.E. at 171.
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of selective allocation." Whether they argued the line of New York
cases headed by Fargo does not appear; however, the court expressly
disclaimed the rationale of that case as a basis for its conclusion.51
Instead, citing its earlier special-power decision, 2 the Massachusetts
court applied the reddendo singula singulis theory to allow allocation of
the appointive property to those trusts and legacies valid as appoint-
ments. The beneficiary of the sustained trust thereby received a life
estate, to be followed by a remainder for life to his adopted daughter
and a remainder in fee to his issue, in four times the amount of prop-
erty he would have received as a default taker under the donor's will.5"
Even Massachusetts, however, has limited the extent to which it will
employ selective allocation. In the state's only allocation case since
Minot v. Paine, the Supreme Court held that the requirement of a com-
mon disposition precludes selective allocation among the provisions of
the donee's will when the gifts invalid as appointments are made not by
that will but by the will of one exercising a secondary power created by
the donee's appointment.54 The court's application of the capture doc-
trine, the effect of which was to give at least some of the appointive
property to the same persons who would have taken had selective
allocation been allowed, probably made its decision an easier one than
it might otherwise have been.5
New York. The most extensive development of the selective alloca-
tion doctrine has been in New York, the state of its origin. Since the
decision in Fargo v. Squiers the New York courts have dealt with the
allocation problem some twenty-seven times. While a few aberrational
cases exist, the principle of allocating selectively to avoid perpetuities
problems has in general found judicial acceptance 5
50 "If it shall appear to the court that any of said trusts are invalid ...whether it is
now the duty of said trustees to marshal the funds held by them so as to satisfy such trusts
entirely out of the property held by them which was derived from the individual property
of said ... [donee] and use the appointed funds only for such of said trusts as are not
invalid.. . 2" Id. at 515.
51 "It is unnecessary to determine whether the same result could be reached by the
operation of the doctrine of marshalling of assets. ... ." Id. at 525, 120 N.E. at 172.
52 Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 75 N.E. 141 (1905).
53 The beneficiary was one of the donee's four children, while the gift in default of ap-
pointment was to the donee's issue. 230 Mass. at 523-24, 120 N.E. at 171. Had the capture
doctrine been applied, the difference would possibly have been even greater. See generally
the material cited note 30 supra.
54 Amerige v. Attorney Gen., 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949).
55 Id. at 660, 88 N.E.2d at 133. The income appointees under the secondary power were
among the second donee's intestate successors, and were in addition the default takers under
the first donee's will. Id. at 652-53, 88 N.E.2d at 129. One of them was living and might
have had subsequent issue who would have been appointees of the corpus. Id. at 653, 88
N.E.2d at 129-30. See generally note 30 supra.
56 This acceptance has extended beyond the usual case of a common disposition of owned
and appointive property. Cheever v. Cheever, 172 App. Div. 353, 157 N.Y. Supp. 428 (1st
Dep't 1916) (allowing selective allocation of two masses of appointive property under
separate powers in order to avoid use of one mass in violation of the Rule).
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Of the nine cases in which selective allocation has been denied two
were decided on procedural issues not going to the merits or applicability
of the doctrine. The first of these cases refused to consider the alloca-
tion problem on the ground that the record contained insufficient facts
to permit a decision.57 In the other case an estoppel notion was used
to bar a request for selective allocation by parties who had acquiesced
in a decision entered twenty-seven years before. 8 That decision had
held that, to the extent the donee's appointments via a common disposi-
tion were void under the Rule Against Perpetuities, default takers and
remaindermen were entitled to the appointive property. After twenty-
seven years of acceptance, the Surrogate held, the parties could no longer
challenge the previous order; and since, of course, no disposition under
that order violated the Rule, there was obviously no need for selective
allocation. 9
In cases which have come closer to the merits of selective allocation
the New York courts have three times refused to utilize the doctrine on
the ground that a common disposition embracing both valid and void
gifts was lacking.6" In all three cases the donee's residuary bequest
alone constituted a common disposition, and all residuary gifts were valid
as appointments. Absence of a true common disposition has also been
the reason for denial of selective allocation in a case in which the donee
of a power specifically provided for substitutional appointments to take
effect should the initial appointments fail.61 Selective allocation to maxi-
mize validity, the court reasoned, was unnecessary since full validity
could be attained simply by following the donee's expressed intent.
62
None of these six decisions casts any doubt on the vitality of the
selective allocation doctrine as a method of avoiding perpetuities prob-
lems in appropriate cases. Twice, however, the inferior courts have
adopted the Pennsylvania view and have refused to minimize the
destructive effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities with selective alloca-
57 Matter of Gardner, 272 App. Div. 1064, 75 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1947).
65 Matter of Littleton, 124 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1953). The prior
decision, unreported, is summarized at 443-44.
59 Id. at 444-45.
60 Low v. Bankers Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 143, 200 N.E. 674 (1936); Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 (1908); Matter of Creem, 147 N.Y.S.2d 634
(Surr. Ct. Kings County 1955). The confusion engendered by the decisions concerning the
factors which mark a common disposition is noteworthy. Typifying the frustration of the
courts in this area is the dilemma of Surrogate Wingate:
The court is faced with the somewhat hazardous necessity of attempting to chart a
safe course between the Scylla of Fargo v. Squiers ... and the Charybdis of Low v.
Bankers Trust Company ...
Matter of Brown, 169 Misc. 43, 44, 6 N.Y.S.2d 836, 837 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1938).
See generally notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
61 Matter of Rogers, 170 Misc. 85, 9 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1938).
62 Id. at 87-88, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 588-89.
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tion. Although selective allocation would have preserved substantial
amounts of property for the donee's nominees, in Matter of Berwind6 3
the Surrogate's Court rejected the doctrine, apparently in direct dis-
regard of Fargo. It found that
inequity would result from the diversion of the funds within the donor's
estate to the payment of the donee's debts or for other purposes, in order
to swell the residuary estate in which the undue suspension so grossly
violates the public policy of our State designed to vest future interests
within a reasonable period.64
The only decision wholly to agree with Berwind has been Matter of
Barrett.65  Simply citing the former case, the court held that selective
allocation was unavailable to keep appointive property out of trusts
which as appointments violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.66
While not rejecting the principle of selective allocation as a legitimate
means of avoiding perpetuities problems, the Surrogate's Court has in
one other case refused so to employ the device."' It found that to do so
would merely effect "a rearrangement of the share of the parties to the
greater advantage of some and to the detriment of others" 6s-a con-
sequence elsewhere considered appropriate to selective allocation.69
These three variants aside, New York appears to be wholeheartedly
committed to selective allocation in the perpetuities context. In order
to sustain the validity of appointments under the Rule, the courts have
allocated appointive property to those residuary gifts valid as appoint-
ments,70 to legacies, debts and expenses,7 to legacies only,72 to debts
63 181 Misc. 559, 42 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1943). The default takers were
the donee's surviving descendants, id. at 561, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 61; the appointees were the
donee's husband, one of her children, and the latter's children, id. at 562, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
64 Id. at 565, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 64. Even though selective allocation would not, as the
court feared, have violated the principle of the Rule, see text accompanying note 91 infra,
it would have kept the appointive property tied up longer than did the court's decision.
65 137 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
66 Id. at 763. The donee, who was the donor's brother, appointed to his own wife and
son, id. at 760, but the decision caused the property to go to the donor's intestate successors
because there was no default gift. Id. at 762. It is, of course, possible that the donor's
brother was his only distributee and that the same persons would have taken as appointees
and as the donor's successors; the likelihood of this is slight, however, as it appears from
the report of earlier litigation involving the estate that the appointive property was merely
a part of the donor's estate, the rest having been given to others than the donee. Matter of
Barrett, 206 Misc. 363, 132 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
67 Matter of Lanier, 88 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
68 Id. at 525.
69 Matter of Stern, 99 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
70 Matter of Woodward, 174 Misc. 919, 22 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1940);
Matter of Terwilligar, 135 Misc. 170, 237 N.Y. Supp. 390 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1929).
71 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Meyn, 263 App. Div. 671, 34 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d Dep't
1942); Matter of Peace, 259 App. Div. 838, 19 N.Y.S.2d 181 (2d Dep't 1940); Matter of
Williams, 82 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948); Maynard v. Maynard, 108 Misc.
362, 178 N.Y. Supp. 329 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1919); Matter of Maxwell, 129 N.Y.LJ.
1031 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1953); Matter of Lathers, 64 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Surr. Ct. West-
chester County 1946).
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and expenses only,"3 depending on which elements of the will besides
the offending gift were held to make up the common disposition. A
majority of these decisions justify selective allocation, either expressly74
or impliedly,75 by the general constructional preference for that reading
which gives an instrument its maximum effectiveness. 76  In effect, the
reasoning is that, absent an ascertainable intent concerning allocation,
the court must postulate what the donee's intent was, or, as most often
is the case, would have been. Since the donee presumably desired his
disposition to be as fully effective as possible and selective allocation
is the adoption of one possible construction of the instrument, selective
allocation should be ordered. The remaining decisions merely invoke
Fargo v. Squiers as justification for the doctrine. 77
Summary
By way of recapitulation, then, selective allocation requires a common
disposition of owned and appointive property, partially valid and par-
tially void as an appointment, but totally valid as a transfer of owned
property. Absent such a disposition the doctrine is inapplicable. Use
of the doctrine has been justified by the analogies of marshalling assets
for creditors and subjecting realty to debts and legacies, by the rule of
72 Matter of Fuller, 131 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1954); Matter of
Warren, 192 Misc. 881, 81 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Surr. Ct. Erie County 1948); Matter of Brown,
169 Misc. 43, 6 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1938); Matter of Wickham, 139
Misc. 729, 249 N.Y. Supp. 148 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1931); Matter of Belmont, 22
N.Y.S.2d 800 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1929). See Chase Nat'l Bank v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434, 39 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1st Dep't 1943).
73 Matter of Stem, 99 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Matter of Beams,
186 Misc. 739, 53 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd on rehearing, 186 Misc. 742,
65 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1945); Matter of Palmer, 154 Misc. 705, 277 N.Y.
Supp. 816 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1935).
74 Matter of Brown, 169 Misc. 43, 6 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1938);
Matter of Palmer, note 73 supra.
75 Matter of Stern, 99 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Matter of Williams,
82 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948); Maynard v. Maynard, 108 Misc. 362, 178
N.Y. Supp. 329 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1919); Matter of Fuller, 131 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Surr.
Ct. Westchester County 1954); Matter of Warren, 192 Misc. 781, 81 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Surr.
Ct. Erie County 1948); Matter of Lathers, 64 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County
1946) ; Matter of Beams, 186 Misc. 739, 53 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Surf. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd
on rehearing, 186 Misc. 739, 65 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1945). See Chase
Nat'l Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434, 39 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1st
Dep't 1943).
76 The constructional preference for maximum validity is described in 2 Page, Wills § 925
(3d ed. 1941); 2 Powell ff 318, at 688 (1950); 3 Powell ff 401, at 371 (1952).
77 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Meyn, 263 App. Div. 671, 34 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d Dep't
1942); Matter of Peace, 259 App. Div. 838, 19 N.Y.S.2d 181 (2d Dep't 1940); Matter of
Woodward, 174 Misc. 919, 22 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1940); Matter of
Maxwell, 129 N.Y.L.J. 1031 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1953); Matter of Wickham, 139 Misc.
729, 249 N.Y. Supp. 148 (Surf. Ct. Kings County 1931); Matter of Belmont, 22 N.Y.S.2d
800 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1929); Matter of Terwilligar, 135 Misc. 170, 237 N.Y. Supp.
390 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1929).
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construction in favor of giving an instrument maximum effectiveness,
and by the maxim reddendo singula singulis. Pennsylvania permits
selective allocation to minimize the difficulties arising from special
powers but not to accomplish the same purpose vis-&-vis the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Massachusetts applies the doctrine in both situations. New
York's experience with selective allocation has been confined to per-
petuities cases; in this context the doctrine has been accepted. Its
applicability to the special-power situation in New York remains an
open question. No other state has considered any facet of the allocation
problem.
THEORETICAL BASES
While the courts have on occasion propounded one or another of the
three theories of selective allocation just described, they have often
applied the doctrine without offering any explicit rationale for their action.
This is not to say that these cases do not abound with expressions to
the effect that the court is merely "executing the donee's plan of dis-
tribution"; to that extent they follow the pattern of most decisions
in the decedents' estates field."' But the donee's "plan," if indeed
any existed, is not enough to justify selective allocation, or any other
legal conclusions in this area of the law. The accepted philosophy of
decedents' estates is that a testator's freedom to transfer property at
death is subject to external limitations which may in no event be ex-
ceeded. Limits such as the Rule Against Perpetuities and the special-
power restrictions are indeed the very reasons for the existence of allo-
cation problems. Designedly intent-defeating, their application and en-
forcement, by definition, cannot depend upon the donee's preference. 9
Whether they are to be given a wider or narrower range of application
must turn on notions of social desirability and not on the wishes of
those whom the rules are established to curb.
In short, if selective allocation is to be used, there must be a reason
besides "testator's intent" to refrain from applying the relevant intent-
defeating rule. Indeed, intent is completely irrelevant if the justification
for selective allocation is the effectuation of some policy taking pre-
cedence over the intent-defeating rules. With this in mind, the three
judicially-propounded justifications may be examined.
78 Not atypical is the view of the Pennsylvania court:
No rule regarding wills is more settled than the great General Rule that the testator's
intent, if it is not unlawful, must prevail!
Cannistra's Estate, 384 Pa. 605, 607, 121 A.2d 157, 188 (1956).
79 The Rule arose through efforts to block the intent of landed Englishmen to perpetuate
their control over their property. 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.4, at 14; Gulliver, Cases on Future
Interests 362 (1959) ; 5 Powell fi 759, at 537 (1956). Special-power restrictions are grounded
in the policy that the intent of the donor is paramount over that of the donee.
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Marshalling of Assets
The theory of marshalling assets for creditors is totally independent
of the debtor's intent." A principle of equity jurisprudence, marshalling
seeks to ensure fair and just treatment, not of the debtor, but of each
of his creditors."' Thus, courts invoke the principle to restrain a creditor
whose debt is adequately secured by each of two funds from depleting
that fund which represents a junior creditor's only security. 2 Each
creditor is thereby assured of payment and neither is unnecessarily
deprived of any right. It is this doctrine which some courts have found
to provide an analogy for selective allocation.
The universal requirement that all debts be paid before legacies are
satisfied attests to one basic difference in the legal position of creditors
and testamentary beneficiaries. But even on the assumption that the
two creditors in the marshalling situation can profitably be compared
with the two groups of takers under a common disposition, in the case
of marshalling, the policy of fully paying all creditors is unopposed by
competing values. In the selective allocation situation, however, the
restrictive rules enter the picture. The question that the analogy falls
short of answering is whether the equitable policy of favoring full pay-
ment of all takers is more important than the policies underlying the
relevant intent-defeating rule. These policies could well require that
each group of takers be restricted to a ratable share, or could even
dictate an allocation that would maximize the invalidity of gifts.8 3
Nonexoneration of Realty
The second analogy of Fargo-the doctrine of subjecting realty to
debts, expenses and legacies in certain circumstances-rests, as do the
other two major justifications for selective allocation, upon the donee's
intent. Under the normal rule, a decedent's realty is exonerated from
80 See generally 1 Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies 5078-86 (2d ed. 1919); 5 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence § 1414 (5th ed. 1941).
81 The right to have assets marshalled belongs to the junior creditor, i.e., the one-lien
creditor. See, e.g., Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449 (1925); Women's Hosp. v.
67th St. Realty Co., 265 N.Y. 226, 192 N.E. 302 (1934); Evertson v. Booth, 19 Johns. R.
486 (N.Y. 1822). The debtor cannot invoke the doctrine, Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank,
supra, except, in some jurisdictions, to protect homesteads. 1 Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies
5084-85 (2d ed. 1919).82 E.g., Broidy v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 10 F.Rfl. 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying
New York law and collecting cases).
83 Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(2) (requiring selective allocation within
a common disposition to minimize qualification of assets for marital deduction). This
provision has never been litigated. See generally Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes 396-97 (1956); Mertens, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation § 29.56 (1959);
Rodman, "Executor's Power to Allocate Property," 94 Trusts & Estates 801, 804-05 (1955).
Yet another point at which the analogy falters stems from the rule that only the junior
creditor can compel marshalling, note 81 supra. Often it is the donee's estate, corresponding
to the debtor, that requests selective allocation.
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the payment of these charges unless the personalty is insufficient for
the purpose.8 4 When, however, a court finds that satisfying debts, ex-
penses and legacies exclusively from personalty would distort the
decedent's plan of distribution, it may establish a scheme of contribu-
tion by realty which will result in closer approximation of the decedent's
wishes."'
It is true that equitable modification of the exoneration rule may be
likened, in one respect, to the adoption of selective, rather than ratable,
allocation. In both cases variation from what might be called the norm
in order to favor the decedent's presumed intent represents merely the
rejection of a more general assumption of intent.88 Here, however, the
analogy ends. As in the case of marshalling, manipulation of the
exoneration principle affects no external limitation on freedom of testa-
mentary disposition. But any deviation from ratable allocation neces-
sarily contracts the scope of the restrictive rules. To that extent, hinging
a choice of selective allocation upon the exoneration analogy alone
assumes the result sought to be justified.
Constructional Preference
Under the constructional preference rationale, the testator's intent
with regard to allocation is found to be that which will accord the highest
degree of validity to his general plan of distribution. 7 One cannot
quarrel with the premise that a decedent who made the effort of draw-
ing (or paying to have drawn) a written disposition of his property
intended that it be effective. And the courts which have applied this
formalized theory of construction display the virtue, not to be found in
those decisions speaking loosely of executing the testator's plan, of
recognizing that it is the donee's intent respecting allocation and not his
intent as to validity that furnishes the immediate basis for the use of
selective allocation. Nevertheless, constructional preferences as a justi-
fication for selective allocation suffer from the general deficiency of
the Fargo analogies, failure adequately to consider the relation of allo-
cation to the policies underlying the major intent-defeating rules.
Reddendo Singula Singulis
Much the same criticism applies to the reddendo singula singulis
maxim used for the first time to support selective allocation in Van
84 See 3 Am. L. Prop. § 14.21, at 646; 4 Page, Wills § 1438, at 214, § 1472, at 280 (3d ed.
1941) (collecting cases).
85 E.g., Fargo v. Squiers, 154 N.Y. 250, 48 N.E. 509 (1897) (dictum); Rice v. Harbeson,
63 N.Y. 493 (1876); 4 Page, Wills § 1438, at 214, § 1472, at 280 (3d ed. 1941).
86 Note 85 supra.
87 Note 76 supra.
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Syckel.18 Since the maxim presupposes that the decedent's actual intent
to "attribute to each his own" cannot be ascertained," the primary
question in considering selective allocation must be whether the intent-
defeating rules are to be applied wherever possible or only in those cases
in which the proscribed intent is clear. Here again the cases fail to
meet the issue.
Underlying Considerations
So complete an absence of judicial self-analysis on a point of doctrine,
while fortunately rare, does not necessarily imply that the courts allow-
ing selective allocation in the face of the restrictive rules have done so
improperly. To the contrary, analysis suggests that a broad use of selec-
tive allocation can further the precise policies underlying those rules.
Nevertheless, the unadorned conclusion implicit in the reported cases,
that invalidation serves no useful purpose when the proscribed intent
is merely speculative, is insufficient in itself to provide the intellectual
legitimation necessary for selective allocation to gain wider acceptance.
What is required is a critical examination of the effects of selective allo-
cation upon the restrictive rules in the several contexts in which
allocation problems can arise.
The two intent-defeating rules which have thus far been emphasized
are the donor-imposed limits on the donee's choice of appointees (special
powers) and the Rule Against Perpetuities. On the theory that the
appointee under a power takes directly from the donor, the donor is
permitted to "choose his transferees" by restricting the class of objects
to those whom he desires to benefit. The donor's primary intent is
normally to benefit the members of this class, and not those he has
named as default takers or residuary beneficiaries or who constitute
his intestate successors ° The use of selective allocation to validate
appointments in a common disposition by confining the appointive prop-
erty to permissible takers therefore executes the donor's intent far more
accurately than allowing the appointive property to go by default. Since
the sole function of special-power limitations on the donee is to effectuate
88 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
89 The maxim is a rule of construction which, like all rules of construction, is used only
to clarify an intent not apparent on the face of the will. 2 Page, Wills § 916, at 794, 796 (3d
ed. 1941) (collecting cases).
90 Of course, a decedent's desire to have his tax advantage without foregoing dispositive
control may often be fulfilled by a marital deduction trust in which the unexpressed premise
is that the surviving spouse will fail to exercise her general power and will thereby permit
the appointive property to go to carefully selected default takers named in the decedent's
will. See generally Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056; Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes 895 (1956) ; Shattuck & Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook 26 (2d ed. 1953).
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the intent of the donor, no reason appears why this salutary effect of
selective allocation should not be sought.
Similar reasoning applies to cases raising problems under the Rule
Against Perpetuities. An important purpose of the Rule is to keep prop-
erty reasonably free for whatever use future circumstances disclose to
be the most desirable.9' But when appointive property is allowed to pass
to the donor's default takers, his residuary legatees or intestate suc-
cessors, the donee's current evaluation of the most advantageous use
of the resources is often discarded in favor of a determination made,
if at all, a generation earlier. By employing selective allocation a court
not only satisfies the literal requirements of the Rule, but it endorses an
over-all distribution of property based on the donee's contemporary con-
clusions respecting contemporary needs. The flexibility of property use
which is the object of the Rule is thereby maximized.
Mitigating by selective allocation the harsh effects stemming from
agency-oriented restrictive rules, then, is defensible, and indeed desirable.
Paradoxically, it furnishes a method of implementing both the funda-
mental policy of honoring private volition in the transfer of property and
the policies represented by the rules limiting such volition, without the
need of subordinating either value to the other.
FUTURE USES
The paucity of selective allocation decisions may be taken either as
an indication that the device is destined to remain a judicial oddity or
as merely the prelude to widespread use of a potentially significant
wealth-transmission doctrine. Whether selective allocation will grow
in importance depends primarily on three considerations: (1) the effect
that recent changes in the Rule Against Perpetuities will have on the
doctrine's utility; (2) the doctrine's applicability to transfers not now
recognized as satisfying the common disposition requirement; (3) the
possibilities of its employment for purposes other than minimizing the
destructive effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities and special-power
limitations.
The Effect of Perpetuities Changes
The bulk of selective allocation cases, it will be recalled, have involved
common dispositions partially invalid under the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, and most of these cases have arisen in the New York courts. From
1830 to 1958 that state labored under a statutory version of the Rule92
91 5 Powell 1 762 (1956); Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 59 (1955). See note
79 supra.
92 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 229, §§ 16 (realty), 1 (personalty).
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which has been termed by Professor Powell "the most restrictive and
unreasonable Rule Against Perpetuities in the Anglo-American legal
world."93 Though not restoring the common-law Rule, in 1958 the New
York legislature eliminated the numerical restriction of two on measur-
ing lives-in-being.94 It thereby appreciably lengthened the permissible
period for interests created on or after September 1 of that year. Further
amendments in 1960 substantially completed New York's return to com-
mon-law principles. A gross term of twenty-one years was added to
the permissible period for post-April 12, 1960, future interests,95 and
various other statutory departures from traditional doctrine were
Tepealed1
The recent amendments will doubtless sanction many dispositions
that were invalid under the old statute. To predict their effect on the
incidence of cases presenting allocation problems is impossible. Although
the relation-back approach to powers has been modified by applying to
the interests of appointees the law in effect at the time the power is
exercised and not the law obtaining at the time of its creation,9 7 neither
the 1958 nor the 1960 changes are restrospective in operation. All three
-versions of the Rule will continue to be applied by New York courts
for some time to come. Nor can satisfactory conclusions be drawn from
an analysis of the cases to date in terms of the new amendments. The
great majority of New York allocation cases decided under the pre-1958
statute fail to disclose sufficient facts to allow determinations of validity
-under the 1958 or the 1960 changes were the same fact patterns to be
newly presented.
The "wait-and-see" doctrine represents a new approach to the Rule
Against Perpetuities which rejects the Rule's traditional primary re-
quirement-absolute certainty of timely vesting.98 Usually statutory,99
wait-and-see rules require the courts to decide the validity of future
interests on the basis of actual rather than possible events.', 0 In five
93 Powell, "Statutory Changes in the New York Rule Against Perpetuities," 139 N.Y.L.J.,
'March 25, 1958, p. 4, reprinted in N.Y. Real Prop. Law at 38 (Supp. 1960).
94 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 152, § 1, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 456, § 4
(personalty); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 153, § 1, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch.
456, § 3.
95 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11; N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 42. See generally Pasley, "The
1960 Amendments to the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Powers of Appoint-
ment," 45 Cornell L.Q. 679 (1960).
96 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 449, § 1.
97 N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 178-79.
98 See 6 Am. L. Prop. § 24.21, at 63; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 214 (4th
ed. 1942); 5 Powell ff 765, at 563 (1956).
99 While seven states have enacted wait-and-see by statute, notes 101-02 infra, only in
New Hampshire have the courts clearly broken with tradition on their own initiative.
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
100 See generally Simes & Smith § 1230; Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities
Doomed?" 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953); Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the
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states this means deferral of rulings of invalidity at least until the
expiration of preceding life estates'' and, because of differing formu-
lations of the doctrine, in at least four states even longer for certain
types of future interests. 2
While wait-and-see saves many dispositions from invalidity pred-
icated on farfetched contingencies whose occurrence would unduly
postpone vesting, its price is often uncertainty. Under the classical
requirement of absolute certainty of timely vesting, future interests
could be determined to be either void or valid at the initial construction
of the instrument creating them, and the need for selective allocation
could at that time be definitely ascertained. Postponement of the time
for testing validity renders the position of the interest uncertain, and
with it, the need for selective allocation. However, this uncertainty
should not affect a court's willingness to employ selective allocation when
part of a common disposition is possibly invalid but not definitely so.
If the goal of selective allocation is avoidance of distributions raising
perpetuities problems, the fact that the problems are merely a possible
consequence of a given distribution does not make it any less desirable
to use selective allocation. Hence, if early adjudications to establish the
validity (rather than the invalidity) of gifts are to be permitted in the
wait-and-see states, selective allocation can function much as it does in
jurisdictions retaining the common-law Rule. Of course, in those states
which will defer all court questions until the termination of the wait-
and-see period, the cases will be fewer in which selective allocation plays
an important role.
Using Selective Allocation in Other Dispositions
The indispensable prerequisite to the use of selective allocation has
always been a true common disposition of owned and appointive prop-
Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952); Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation:
Hail, Pennsylvania! And Three Cheers for Vermont, Washington and Kentucky; Two
Cheers for Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut; One Cheer for Idaho; and Respectful
Applause for the New Hampshire Court," 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1124 (1960) (surveying the
entire field of perpetuities reform); Mechem, "A Brief Reply to Professor Leach," 108 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1155 (1960).
101 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-95 (1958); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 160, § 27 (Supp.
1960); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 197A (Supp. 1960); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184A, § 1
(1955); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953). See generally
Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 (1954) ; Note,
54 Mich. L. Rev. 723 (1956).
102 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.216; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
27, § 501 (1959); Wash. Rev. Code § 11.98.010 (1959). Because it came at the expiration
of a preceding life estate, the holding of Curtis, note 101 supra, validated a future interest
merely by approving a life-estate waiting period. The way is still open in New Hampshire,
presumably, for a further extension of the period as in the above statutes. The relation-
ship, if any, of Idaho Code Ann. § 55-111 (1957), to wait-and-see is obscure; the statute
has never been litigated. But see Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!
etc.," 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1124, 1129 (1960).
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erty. When the donee has in some way evidenced his intent regarding
the devolution of either of these classes of property, the courts have
refused to alter the allocation he directs, regardless of the consequences
which may flow from application of the intent-defeating rules.103 This
position has been the logical outgrowth both of the maxim that courts
will not vary the testator's expressed intent 1 4 and of judicial reluctance
to subordinate the restrictive rules in the face of clearly violative lan-
guage. However, by finding both a general and a particular intent in
the area of cy pres, courts have been making increasing inroads on the
primacy of the testator's written words.' 5 This methodology, moreover,
has already received some sanction in the context of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 10
In its traditional form cy pres is severely limited in scope. Restricted
to the field of charitable trusts,0 7 the doctrine provides that the impos-
sibility or illegality of a charitable use specified by a testator will not
terminate the trust if a more general charitable purpose and intent can
be ascertained and the trust corpus can be devoted in some manner to
the effectuation of that purpose.0 8 The underlying theory is that the
decedent would have wanted his general charitable intent executed even
though the particular method he chose could not be employed.10 9 Most
states recognize this doctrine, or the practically identical theory of
approximation," either by judicial decision or by statute."'
In a few states, however, cy pres has been extended to the field of
the Rule Against Perpetuities."2 Again, presumably on the theory that
the decedent would have desired that his general plan of benevolence
toward his named legatees be effectuated even if the particular dis-
positive plan he specified could not legally be carried out, a few courts,
103 Notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., Baker v. Hendricks, 240 Ala. 630, 632, 200 So. 615, 617 (1941).
105 See generally 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 432-41 (1953); Fisch, The Cy Pres
Doctrine in the United States (1950) ; Fisch, "Changing Concepts and Cy Pres," 44 Cornell
L.Q. 382 (1959).
106 See notes 112-14 infra and accompanying text.
107 Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States 9 (1950).
108 E.g., Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897); Late Corp. of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 US. 1 (1890).
109 See Zollman, American Law of Charities 75-76 (1924) (collecting cases); 4 Scott,
Trusts § 399, at 2824 (2d ed. 1956). See also Fisch, "Changing Concepts and Cy Press," 44
Cornell L.Q. 382 (1959).
110 While approximation, in theory, relates only to details of administration, in practice
it is often a substitute for cy pres. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States 71
(1950) (collecting cases).
111 The cases and statutes adopting cy pres are collected in 4 Powell ff 587, at 522-24
(1954).
112 On cy pres and the Rule, see generally Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 74-80
(1955); Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving The Rule
Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation," 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 384 (1946).
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under enabling statutes 13 or their own common law powers,114 have
replaced offending testamentary provisions with valid substitutes equally
effective to achieve the decedent's general purpose.
In those jurisdictions which have in this way implicitly approved a
contraction of the Rule's scope, no reason appears why application of
the selective allocation principle should be limited to the common dis-
position situation. In many cases in which the will specifies a plan of
allocation, the donee-testator's general purpose is simply to confer
economic benefits on the persons, and in the amounts, specified in his
will, be the persons named appointees or legatees. His allocation of
owned and appointive property among the dispositions in the will has no
intrinsic importance to him and represents only a tidy scheme of
distributing all the property subject to his power of disposal. In such a
case, if the testamentary plan of allocation will fail under the Rule
because of the invalidity of one or more appointments, but the legatees
can validly take as appointees, a court would be executing the primary
purpose of the decedent in allocating property owned to those named
as appointees and leaving appointive property to the named legatees.
Much the same analysis applies to cases in which an appointment
fails because made to one outside the class of permissible objects. Once
a jurisdiction is willing to apply cy pres beyond the charitable trust
context, it should be willing to allocate owned property to nonobjects,
and appointive property to objects, and thereby to fulfill both the
donee's primary intent to benefit all named takers and the donor's
purpose of passing the appointive property to those he has named as
permissible appointees. Nor would this be the first instance of the
judicial use of cy pres to confine the exercise of a special power to its
objects. The rule in England before abolition of the fee tail was that a
donee's appointment to his children for life and then to his grand-
children, when the children alone were permissible appointees, would be
converted by cy pres into an appointment to the children in fee tail."5
113 E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.216 (1960) (authorizing cy pres reformation of any interest
violating the Rule); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11-a (1959) (permitting reduction of age con-
tingencies to 21); N.Y. Real Prop Law § 42-b (same). In addition, statutes regulating
accumulations universally provide that a direction for accumulation beyond the permissible
period is invalid only as to the excess period. E.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 61. See Gulliver,
Cases on Future Interests 433 (1959) (collecting statutes).
114 E.g., Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434 (1891) (reducing age contingency to 21);
Jackson v. Brown, 13 Wend. 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (converting successive life estates
into fee tail); Allyn v. Mather, 9 Conn. 114 (1832) (same); Gibson v. McNeely, 11 Ohio St.
131 (1860) (same).
115 E.g., Pitt. v. Jackson, 2 Bro. Ch. 51, 29 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ch. 1786). But see Brudenell
and Brooks v. Elwes, 1 East. 442, 102 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1802) (restricting doctrine to
wills); Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jun. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (Ch. 1794) (restricting
doctrine to personalty).
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The trend of courts and legislatures today is away from the "remorse-
less rule" approach to the Rule Against Perpetuities and towards a
standard of flexibility; away from hostility to any private transfer run-
ning afoul of the Rule and towards a desire to permit insofar as pos-
sible reasonable dispositions which are technically, but not in spirit,
contrary to its purposes. The adoption of cy pres and analogous theories
to achieve this flexibility may accordingly be expected to spread. Similar
policies would be served by a concomitant expansion of the selective
allocation doctrine to cases in which, though a specific allocation appears,
it is merely incidental to the donee's primary intent.
Using Selective Allocation for New Purposes
Besides its potentialities as a method of saving gifts which technically
infringe the Rule Against Perpetuities and special-power limitations,
selective allocation offers possibilities for solving other problems which
may arise when appointments become entangled with statutory limita-
tions on charitable gifts, statutory marital election provisions, and the
conflict of laws.
Restrictions on Charitable Gifts. Thirteen American jurisdictions
have statutorily circumscribed the privilege of testamentary transfer to
charities.116 Designed to preserve the moral right of the decedent's
immediate family to the major share of his estate"' and to protect the
family from a kind of spiritual blackmail in which the decedent con-
vinces himself, or is convinced by others, that the repose of his soul
requires his property to be devoted to charitable uses,"" the statutes
employ two basic devices. They make voidable a will of which a charity
is a beneficiary if (1) the will was made within a specified period before
death," 9 or (2) the charitable gift exceeds a certain percentage of the
estate.2 0
The question of whether a donee's appointments to charity can render
the donor's will voidable has never been the subject of reported litigation.
If the relation-back or agency theory of powers is adhered to, however,
a charitable appointee must be considered as taking directly from the
donor of the power and under his will. If, then, the donee's exercise in
116 See generally 1 Page, Wills 85-97 (3d ed. 1941); 6 Powell ff 969 (1958); Zollman,
American Law of Charities 349-60 (1924) ; Joslin, "Legal Restrictions on Gifts to Charities,"
21 Tenn. L. Rev. 761 (1951).
17 The statutes usually permit attack on a will only by a member of a limited class of
relatives, reflecting the protective nature of the restriction. See, e.g., N.Y. Deced. Est. Law
§ 17 ("surviving husband, wife, child, descendant or parent"). 1
118 Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 112 (1955); Joslin, "Legal Restrictions on
Gifts to Charities," 21 Tenn. L. Rev. 761, 762, 764 (1951).
119 E.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 41 (30 days).
120 E.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 41 (one-third).
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favor of a charity would have transgressed the statute if made by the
donor, presumably the donor's will becomes subject to attack under
the statute.' When the donee appoints to charity in a will which also
contains gifts of owned property to noncharitable legatees, the attack
can be averted by allocating appointive property to the noncharities and
relegating owned property to the charity. In cases in which allocation
was of no intrinsic importance to the donee, or was merely of secondary
importance, the intent of both donor and donee would unquestionably
be served by distributing the property in this way. Moreover, neither
of the policies served by these admittedly intent-defeating statutes would
be nullified by selective allocation in the appointment situation.2 Fic-
tions aside, it is the donee and not the donor who makes the decision
to benefit a charitable appointee; the very fact that the donor has given
the donee discretion in the matter almost conclusively shows that he was
laboring under no delusions about the relation of his gift to salvation.
Furthermore, selective allocation would not alter the protection afforded
to a testator's family by the statutes; in allocating appointive property
to the noncharitable bequests, the court would ensure that the total
amount of property passing to charity through the donor's will did not
exceed the statutory percentage limitation. Wholly aside from these
considerations, it is arguable that those who would take only if the gift
to charity were invalidated would in most cases be persons having no
moral claim to, or at least no remaining need for, his property. The
exercise of a testamentary power of appointment normally occurs a
considerable time after its creation-often a full generation after.123
If those persons who would have taken the property as intestate suc-
cessors at the donor's death are alive at all, they are probably economi-
cally adjusted to their failure to benefit from the donor's will.124
Selective allocation could be used in the reverse situation as well-
when the donee's gift to charity would fail if considered a gift of owned
121 While the more obvious difficulty arises under the percentage-limitation statutes, if
the donor's will made no charitable gifts but was executed within the statutory period,
the later appointment to charity might subject it to similar attack under the time-limitation
statutes.
122 The situation was different under the true mortmain statutes, which attempted to
limit the power of the Church vis-h-vis the Crown. 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 452
(1951); Zollman, American Law of Charities 341 (1924). Until the Mortmain and Chari-
table Uses Act, 54-55 Vic. c. 73 (1891), the principle of the original enactment, 7 Edw. 1,
St. 2 (1279), remained in force. [Etc., as at present.]
123 The donor's very reason for using the power of appointment device is often a desire
to extend the duration of the period in which testamentary plans can be revised. See note
6 supra and accompanying text.
124 Years later, when the power is exercised, even the testator's children who were
minors at his death ought to be self-sufficient. Compare Preface to Gray, Restraints on
Alienation at iii-x (2d ed. 1895). And if the donor's spouse is donee, her need, of course, is
at an end.
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property. If the bequest, as part of the donor's estate, would not raise
the donor's charitable gift total above the statutory percentage, alloca-
tion of appointive property to the charity would save the donee's
charitable gift without impairing his gifts to others. As before, this
would infringe no policy of the percentage limitation statutes and would
sacrifice neither the donor's nor the donee's intent. However, selective
allocation to shield a charitable gift made by the donee within a statu-
tory predeath period could not be reconciled with the statute's purpose.
Such a gift would be precisely the case contemplated by the statute-a
gift which quite possibly resulted from hasty and irrational action.
When the total of the donor's and donee's charitable gifts exceeds
the total of their legal maxima, or if the donee's will was executed within
the proscribed period before his death, even selective allocation would be
unable to impart complete validity to the gifts. Its use would merely
shift the burden of possible invalidity from the donor's will to that of
the donee. In such a case ease of administration would suggest that
the invalid gift be allocated to the more-recently-deceased donee's estate,
since his intestate successors would probably be easier to ascertain than
those of the donor.
Statutory Marital Rights. Similar to the family-protection policy
underlying the statutory restrictions on charitable gifts is the purpose
of the spouse's election. Many states guarantee a fixed proportion of a
decedent's estate to the surviving spouse by allowing her an absolute or
conditional right to elect that proportion in lieu of the provision made
for her in the decedent's will.12 5 Property over which the decedent had
a power of appointment, even a general testamentary power, is not sub-
ject to the statutory share,126 and therefore is neither included in the
decedent's estate in computing the share nor, presumably, when the
spouse is an appointee, considered as a testamentary provision for her in
determining the existence of a right of election. In the latter situation, if
the spouse is allowed to take as appointee as well as to exercise the right
of election, the total amount of property passing to her at the decedent's
death may far exceed the amount contemplated by the legislature in
prescribing the statutory share. One way of avoiding this result is
refusal to permit the spouse to elect against the will without also re-
nouncing the appointment, and two jurisdictions have adopted this
125 E.g., N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 18.
126 Fiske v. Fiske, 173 Mass. 413, 53 N.E. 916 (1899); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Green, 160 Misc. 370, 289 N.Y. Supp. 473 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1936); Kates' Estate, 282
Pa. 417, 128 Ad. 97 (1925). Compare Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937)
(surviving spouse entitled to statutory share in property transferred inter vivos by decedent
who retained life estate and power of revocation) ; Powers, "Illusory Transfers and Section
18," 32 St. John's L. Rev. 193 (1958).
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requirement." 7 An alternate method of achieving the same result would
be to allocate owned property to the spouse in an amount sufficient to
defeat her right of election and the appointive property to the will's
remaining gifts. Here again, selective allocation would be appropriate
only where the donee made a common disposition of owned and appoin-
tive property or where cy pres could be applied. Within these limits,
however, the spouse would take in the maner contemplated by the
election statute, and the decedent's desires respecting the distribution
of the property within his power of testamentary disposition would be
honored.
Conflict of Laws. Powers of appointment with multistate contacts
may present choice-of-law problems 2 ' and another use for selective
allocation. If the donee of the power was domiciled in a state with an
unusually restrictive perpetuities period while the appointment in his
will is governed by the common-law Rule, the testamentary transfer of
127 Fiske v. Fiske, note 126 supra; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 180.8(c) (1950). The Pennsyl-
vania statute was enacted to reverse Huddy's Estate, 236 Pa. 276, 84 At. 909 (1912). Com-
mission's Comment, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 180.8(c) (1950).
128 See generally Land, Trusts in the Conffict of Laws § 3 (1940) ; Durand & Herterich,
"Conffict of Laws and the Exercise of Powers of Appointment," 42 Cornell L.Q. 185 (1957);
Hopkins, "The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 53 Yale L.J. 221 (1944).
The majority of courts faced with multistate allocation problems have automatically ap-
plied the law governing the validity and effect of the appointment-their own law-and
have allowed selective allocation. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Meyn, 263 App. Div.
671, 34 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d Dep't 1942); Matter of Stem, 99 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1950); Matter of Fuller, 131 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1954);
Matter of Warren, 192 Misc. 781, 81 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Surr. Ct. Erie County 1948); Matter
of Brown, 169 Misc. 43, 6 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1938). None of these
decisions appears to recognize the significance of the foreign contact. Other courts have,
similarly without analysis, denied selective allocation when multistate contacts led to the
applicability of different laws to the owned and appointive property. Amerige v. Attorney
General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949); Matter of Barrett, 137 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Surr.
Ct. N.Y. County 1955); Matter of Berwind, 181 Misc. 559, 42 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Surr. Ct. N.Y.
County 1943). Only in Chase Nat'l Bank v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App.
Div. 434, 39 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1st Dep't 1943), was the foreign factor mentioned as relevant
to the decision whether to employ selective allocation. The court announced its refusal to
use the device, assigning as its reason the donee's foreign domicile and the consequent
subjection of his owned property to another law. Yet it ordered appointive property to be
applied to the full payment of certain legacies which were the only gifts in the will
capable of valldly transferring appointive property. The donee seemingly had not specified
which fund, owned or appointive, was to be used for their payment. While this amounts
to the utilization of selective allocation, for present purposes the court's language can be
taken at face value. Its rejection of the doctrine may have meant that the law governing
the appointment governed the allocation issue but that that law did not recognize selective
allocation in a multistate context-clearly an erroneous conclusion. It may have meant
that another law governed allocation, although the court omitted any indication of which
law that would be. Or it may have meant that although the law governing the appointment
governed allocation and that that law permitted selective allocation wherever it would be
allowed were the case purely local, the facts did not present such a case. In Berwind and
Barrett, supra, the denial of selective allocation apparently rested on the assumption that
the law governing the appointment governed allocation but that the law thus applied did
not recognize use of the doctrine to avoid perpetuities problems-another clearly erroneous
conclusion. The Court in Amerige, supra, automatically applied the law governing the
appointment but held that the absence of a common disposition was fatal. The choice-of-law
question thus remains open.
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his own property may be partially void although the power was validly
exercised. Differences between the two applicable laws as to charitable
gifts or the rights of spouses may produce similar divergences in the
effectiveness of the donee's will. Selective allocation could be as effec-
tive in maximizing validity here as in the purely domestic cases. Indeed,
the doctrine has long been employed where the donee's appointment
partially transgresses a short perpetuities period while his gift of owned
property is valid under a more liberal Rule. The policy considerations
which justify the device are constant, whether the invalidity problems
stem from the divergences of two bodies of law or from differing prin-
ciples within a single internal law.
CONCLUSION
A product of the fifteenth-century battle for the privilege of trans-
ferring land by will, the power of appointment still possesses legal
characteristics which reflect the conceptual fictions of that era. While
the device's modern utility in part derives from these very fictions, they
can also destroy the reasonable testamentary plans of a donee unschooled
in the metaphysical niceties of the common law. Adherence to the
purpose of the rules governing the game of wealth transmission from
generation to generation, rather than to the rules' literal requirements,
has produced selective allocation as a means of upholding reasonable
exercises of dead-hand control. Whether from a lack of courage to shake
off too many of the doctrinal restrictions on the power of testators, or
from lack of circumstances in which to do so, selective allocation has
thus far been confined within narrow limits. But the trend away from
rigid conceptualism, together with a widening appreciation of the con-
texts in which selective allocation is appropriate, may be expected to
endorse the doctrine as a flexible tool for the achievement of relevant
values.8 o
129 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Meyn, 263 App. Div. 671, 34 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d
Dep't 1942); Matter of Stem, 99 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Matter of
Fuller, 131 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1954); Matter of Warren, 192
Misc. 781, 81 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Surr. Ct. Erie County 1948); Matter of Brown, 169 Misc. 43,
6 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1938).
130 See McDougal, "Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Re-
form," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1083 (1942) (summarizing policy norms in future interests
cases).
1961]
